Nothing about the Seventh Circuit’s recent per curiam decision in Kenosha Unified School District No. 1 Board of Education v. Whitaker, No. 16-8019 (7th Cir. Nov. 14, 2016), could be considered much of a mystery, but file the case away as something you don’t see often. It answers the question of what happens to the court of appeals’ jurisdiction if the district court makes and then withdraws certification of an interlocutory order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
While many of us spent this past Halloween gorging on a variety of candies and sweets, Wisconsin’s court of appeals was busy rendering an opinion that likely left Travis Technology High School (“Travis Tech”) with a decidedly bitter taste in its mouth. Ceria M. Travis Academy, Inc. v. Evers, No. 2015AP2314, (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2016), an opinion written by Judge Joan Kessler of District I (and recommended for publication in the official reports), confirmed that parties to an administrative proceeding can negotiate a settlement agreement that not only stipulates to a remedy for future violations but waives the breaching-party’s right to seek judicial review when the agency invokes the remedy.
As we wrap up another election cycle that has kept “fact checkers” working overtime analyzing the many dubious claims by candidates of all political persuasions, the Seventh Circuit has issued a decision that reminds us of the value of the truth—at least insofar as it concerns truth (or “substantial truthfulness” in this case) as a defense to a claim for tortious interference with contract.
In Wesbrook v. Ulrich, No. 15-3870 (7th Cir. Oct. 20, 2016), a Wisconsin doctor sued two of his colleagues for tortious interference with his employment contract, alleging that statements made by the colleagues to the clinic’s Board of Directors led to his firing. The defendants sought and obtained summary judgment on the grounds that the statements were either true or, at the very least, “substantially true.”
Pine Top Receivables has returned to the published opinions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. We previously wrote about Pine Top’s successful attempt to compel arbitration with a Uruguayan company and the intersection of the Federal Arbitration Act and the Panama Convention.
Pine Top was again before the Seventh Circuit in Pine Top Receivables of Illinois, LLC v. Transfercom, Ltd., No. 16-1073 (7th Cir. Sept. 1, 2016), which addressed the effect of a contractual service-of-suit clause on a party’s right to remove a case to federal court.
Every now and then we see something in the reported decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that seems noteworthy because we’ve never seen it before. The following is one such example.
Seventh Circuit Rule 40(e) is entitled “Rehearing Sua Sponte before Decision,” and it provides, in relevant part, that a soon-to-be-issued opinion, if it takes a position that would overrule prior decisions of the circuit, or if it creates a circuit split, “shall not be published unless it is first circulated among the active members of this court and a majority of them do not vote to rehear en banc the issue of whether the position should be adopted.”
Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 14-1935 (7th Cir. July 19, 2016), written by Judge Diane Sykes and joined by Judge William Bauer and Judge Michael Reagan (of the Southern District of Illinois, sitting by designation), met both Rule 40(e) prerequisites. It overruled prior circuit law and created a split with a recent 9th Circuit decision.